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哈金森案例全文Hutchinson v.Proxmire et al.，No.78-680
（一）本案当事人：
本案原告：哈金森教授（Ronad Hutchinson）。
本案被告：蒲克斯迈尔参议员（Sen. Willian Proxmire）
（二）本案审理经过：
系由联邦最高法院向联邦上诉法院第七巡回法院调察。原案于一九七九年四月十七日辩论终结，同年六月二十九日裁决。
（三）案情节略（Syllabus）：
被告（美联邦参议员）为公开揭发政府浪费公币，曾设置"每月金光奖"（Golden Fleeceof the Month Award）。此项月奖曾经由被告授予负责核定委托担任情绪行为研究计划之联邦有关机关。该项研究系由委托机关资助原告从事客观测量攻击行为，并侧重将某种动物之类似行为之研究。该项之研究。该项金光月奖消息系被告在参议院之讲演时发表。而且这篇演讲词是经由蒲参议员之立法助理员列入向新闻界普遍送发的新闻稿之中。
事后，蒲参议员复将金光月得主消息编入其向选民寄送之立法简讯中，并在电视访问中加以提及。其立法助理在与委手研究机关通话时亦引涉其事。原告遂在联邦地方法院提出告诉，指控被告以授与金光月奖蓄意诽谤及透过新闻媒介向全国广事宜扬等其他罪状（alleging，inter alia），致对其事业及学术地位造成损害。联邦地方法院判决对被告有利，认为宪法上之议员言论免责权条款对参议员对原告所从事之委托研究经费之调查，对参议员在议会之发言及向报界发布新闻等行为则赋与绝对免责权，因为以上诸项行为均属国会通知选民之职能范围之内（Within the "informing function"of Congress）。地方法院又为确定被告赔偿责任之目的计而进一步认为原告系属"社会名流"（Public figure）。因之，被告即受宪法第一条规定之保障，原告则须提出事例确证被告系具有实际恶意（actual malice）始可构成诽谤罪。同时，地方法院认为根据当事人双方之书面诉状，庭上证词及口头答辩等资料，所谓"实际恶意"问题并不存在。被告既对本案来经详加调查，且在综陈本案时并无武断编织或有失公平足以构成"实际恶意"之情事。最后，地方法院认为即使原告不具"社会名流"身份之私人，但根据相关之州法亦必对被告有利。
联邦上诉法院重新肯定言论免责权之规定确系保障蒲参议员向新闻界及在其向选民寄送之新闻简报上所发布之声明。上诉法院又裁定蒲参议员之立法助理随后打电话给负责委托研究之联邦政府机关及议员本人在电视访问节目中所作之声明虽不受宪法上言论免责权规定之保障，但仍受宪法上第一条正案之保障，因为原告系一"社会名流"，而且并无"实际恶意的记录。
（四）判决主旨：
1、本院判案之向例系凡可用非涉宪理由得以处理者，即避免视其为宪法问题解决之。本案基于特别之考虑须先就其是否适宪问题加以解决。设被告具有宪法上之议员言论免责权，则其他问题均无需考虑。上诉法院对地方法院之判决似未予采定，使上诉之问题非涉及宪法上第一条修正案之基本问题即无法获得解决，故此等基本问题须由本院解决。
2.宪法上议员言论免责权之规定对议员个人以发布新闻及寄送新闻简讯作为传递资讯之行为不予保障。
（a）从制宪史暨文字两方面言，议员言论免责权之条文并无意为任何（议员）在议场以外所作之诽谤性言论设立一项免于法律的绝对特权；司法先例均支持此项结论，亦即议员如将其原在议场上所发表之诽谤性讲词重新刊印，则仍不得免责（原判决页一二七~一三○）。
（b）本案所提及之新闻稿或立法简讯对参议院之议事既非必要，亦非议事程序本身之一部。Cravel v. U.s.，408U.s.606；Doe v.Mcmilan，412U.s.306，p.130.
（c）立法简讯及新闻稿之发布并非国会议员向外界报告其活动之所谓"通知职责"（"informing function"）特权之一部。议员个人以发布新闻稿或寄送立法简讯方式对外递达其活动情形亦非立法职能或构成立法程序中议事辩论之一部；此与属于国会通知职能部分之投票或拟具委员会报告等行为相较，则知立法简讯及新闻稿之发布仅系用以通知议场以外人士之重要方法，而且亦只能代表议员个人之立法与意见而已。
3、原告既非"社会名流"，故New York Tmies Co. v.Sulivan一案中所确立之"实际恶意"之证明标准即不适用。地方报纸所载联邦政府机关委托原告担任研究之报导，以及原告在报界报导其于聆悉获奖之反应时表示已与报界早有往还之两椿事实均不能证明原告在金光奖发生纠纷之前即已成为"社会名流".实际上是在诽谤讼案发生之后原告始与报界有了接触，而且这种接触亦不过只限于涉及原告对金光奖消息发布的态度反应这一方面的消息而已。同时，被控诽谤者每不能以其本身行为使被告成为社会名流的作法来为自己制造辩护。被告对政府预算浪费之关心亦不足使原告成为"社会名流"，因为原告亦从未在关心政府预算浪费这种大问题上扮演过任何具为显赫出名之角色。（页一三三 ~一三六）579 F.2d 1027，原判改决并发回。
首席大格尔（Bruger，C.J.）代表本院宣读裁决意见。大法官怀特（White）、马歇尔（Marshall）、步拉克门（Blackman）、鲍威尔（Powell）、芮奎斯特（Rehnquist）、史蒂文斯（Stevens）等联名赞同。史提华（Stewart）大法官表示部分赞同，部分保留。白瑞南（Brenan）大法官表示共议（页一三六）
原告 辩护律师卡文朗（Michael E.Cavanaugh）
被告 辩护律师芮威德（Alan Raywid）
（五）判决全文：首席大法官柏格尔宣判本院裁决意见：
本院核准调查439U.S.1066（1979）一案，旨在三项问题，（1）国会议员如因发布新闻稿件或寄送新闻简讯而被控诽谤声明是否受宪法第一条六款议员言论名责权规定之保障；（2）原告哈金森究否为"社会名流"或"政府官员"以便决定在New York Times Co.v.Sullivan一案所确立这所谓"实际恶意"之标准能否适用于本案；（3）被告是否应由本字给予明确裁决。
原告（亦即本案上诉人）哈金森（Ronald Hutchinson）系一行为科学研究专家控告联邦参议员蒲克斯迈尔（William Proxmire）及其立法助理斯华兹（Morton （Schwartz）因颁授"金光奖"而构成诽谤罪。金光奖业经颁授与委托哈金森教授从事研究之联邦政府机关。哈金森指控被告非但决定颁授"金光奖"而且向全国广为宣扬。因此，被告毁谤他并对他的事业及学术地位均造成伤害，进而涉及他的契约关系。联邦地方法院判决支持被告，联邦上诉法院亦维持原判。
Ⅰ
被告蒲克斯迈尔系威斯康辛州选出之联邦参议员。一九七五年三月曾创设所谓"金光月奖"来宣扬他所认为浪费政府公币的最显恶之政府机关。一九七五年四月第二号"金光月奖"颁予国科会（National Science Foundation），国家航技太空总署（National Aeronautics and Space Acministration），及海军研究处（Office of Naval Research），因为以上三大联邦政府机构在已往七年中曾发付近五十万元资助哈金森从事委托研究。
在金光月奖宣布时，哈金森适任（密西根）卡拉马邹州立精神病院（Kalamazoo State Mental Hospital）研究部主任。此前，曾以佛卡斯特州立老人养疗中心（Ft.Custer State Home）担任类似职务。这些精神病院及老人疗养院均由密西根州政府精神保健厅负责经办。因之，在此两项职位任内，哈金森均系一州政府之职员。在涉案的大部期间，其又兼任西密西根大学教授。一九七五年当卡拉马邹精神病院研究部撤销时，哈金森逐转任一非营利机构之行为研究基金会研究部主任。研究基金亦由州精神病院转移至该基金会。
哈金森大部分工作均着力于情绪行为的研究。特别是在寻求一项测量攻击行为的客观标准，并且集中在对某类动物之行为类型之研究，诸如这些动物被暴露在各种严惩的紧张刺激之下使会有咬牙切齿的情形出现。国家航技太空总署及海军研究处之所以对此项研究有兴趣乃在其具有潜力来解决因人类长期被紧关于闭室以从事太空或深海探研工作时所可能发生的相关情绪行为问题。
选定因委托该项计划而受奖之联邦机关之工作系由立法助理斯华兹根据其个人调查研究资料所代为蒲参议员而决定的。在搜集浪费政府开支的证据过程中，斯华兹曾将哈金森依据委托计划所提出的各种研究报告加以查阅。报告中进一步透露哈金森亦曾接受海军研究处/国科会及密西根精神保健厅等单位之资助。斯华兹了解除上述机构以外，其他聊邦机关亦先后资助哈金森研究。经过与委托机关联络之后，斯华兹即与蒲议员草凝其于一九七五年四月十八日在参院关于本案之讲稿；这项讲稿在加上序言及结语之后即当作新闻稿寄发给全国及国外的二七五个新闻单位。
在新闻稿发出之前，斯华兹曾将有关公布金光奖之消息以电话通知哈金森。哈氏即抗议新闻稿对其研究计划内容之描述非但欠确而且不全。斯华兹答称新闻稿内容并无失平之处。
在参院讲演中，蒲参议员对联邦委托哈金森研究计划曾加描述，并以下列评语作为结论：
对这种无聊计划的资助使我气愤到要咬牙切齿，大吼大闹。在我看来，这种委托研究计划真是岂有此理。哈金森博士的研究计划应该使纳税人和猴子都要咬牙切齿。事实上，这位大博士从他的猴子身上发了一笔横财，而且在研究过程中，把美国的纳税人都当成了猴子来戏弄。现在该是联邦政府停耍这种猴戏的时候了。很清楚地看出哈金森这种把猴子用烈酒灌醉，使它发怒而咬牙切齿的研究毫无价值。现在我们应立即制止哈金森及资助其研究的官僚对纳税人所进行的愚弄榨取，此正其时。（121，国会纪录而10803（1975）。
一九七五年五月，蒲参议员在其寄送给全国各地及其选区名单上列名的十万人及选民的立法简讯上亦提到金光月奖一事。该项新闻简讯系将演说及新闻稿之要点重加说明。一九七五年末，蒲参议员在接受电视访问节目中虽未直接指名哈金森其人，但仍提及哈金森的研究计划。最后一次提到该项研究计划见诸于一九七六年二月寄发的立法简讯。在简讯中，蒲参议员就一九七五年所颁布的全部金光月奖作一总结。虽未提及哈金森本人名字，但确有以下报导：
…国科会、太空总署及海军研究处均获得金光奖，因为这些机构了为确定猴子何以咬牙切齿而联合花费五十万元。
所有研究何以猴子咬牙切齿的计划均已停止。猴戏亦不再登场。
在金光奖宣布之后，斯华兹代表蒲参议员与若干资助此项研究计划之联邦政府机构联联接触。在其向法庭的陈词纪录中，斯华兹声称无意劝阻委托研究之机关继续发款资助此项研究，而仅系就该案加以讨论而已，相反地，哈金森辩称斯华兹所打的这些联络电视即意图劝说委托机关中止发款及研究契约。
Ⅱ
一九七六年四月十六日哈金森于威斯康辛之联邦地方法院提诉本案，在第一项罪名中，原告指控由于蒲、斯两人行动之结果，致使其"遭受职业尊重之丧失、及个人情绪之伤害；为众攻讦，备受屈辱，且个人随极度之精神折磨、肉体病痛。尤有进者，使其遭受所得之损失及未来谋生之能力。"第二项罪名，原告指控被告之行为已干涉其本人与资助者间之契约关系。稍后，原告修正其讼状，外加另一指控称其个人隐私权及生活宁静业已遭受破坏。
被告动议改变审理判地点并迅予判决。在其动议中，被告力主其所有之言行均受宪法上议员言论免责任权条文之保障。之外，被告辩称其批评公款支用乃系宪法第一条修正案言论自由条款所保障之权利，并认为原告兼具社会名流及政府官员双重身份，故须责成其证明被告有"实际恶意"之存在。被告坚认本案之事实将使"实际恶意"之论据无法成立。
地方法院对被告动机改变审判地点一节未予置理，但批准被告所提迅予裁决之请求。地方法院如此决定系基于被告所提之两项理由。该院认为宪法上所决定议员言论免责权之条款系绝对保障被告就哈金森研究经费所进行调查之活动，蒲参议员在参议院之演说以及对新闻界所发布包括该篇演说新闻亦均在保障之列。地方法院所获致之结论是调查行动及参院演说很明显地是包括在言论免责条款范围之内。而新闻之发布据称亦受保障，因其仍属国会之"通知职责".为支持其所持之结论，地方法院依据实例来解释法律曾授与议员免费邮寄之特权。（Franking Privileqe）虽则联邦地方法院引用国会之"通知职责"及免费邮寄特权，但并未根据那种论比来作为其对有关新闻发布所下之结论。地方法院倒是认为新闻稿发布之措施就宪法的意义而言，其与电视业或广播业直接从议场内转播议员演说之作法并无二致。地方法院未凭国会"通知职责"所作之裁决涵义本身即可明知立法简讯并不受议员言论免责权之保障。
随后，地方法院始转以宪法第一条修正案为理由来解释其何以批准对源自新闻简讯及电业访问的争执应作明快之裁决。地方法院所下之结论为：
为确定被告之法律责任计，哈金森则被视为社会名流：有关于哈金森博士长期从事于公款资助之研究工作，其积极争取联邦及州政府之委托，地方报纸对其研究计划之报导以及社会公众对其自愿参与公款动支情事之兴趣等等，地方法院作为结论，认为为裁决本案之目的，原告系一社会名流人士。同时，原告本人亦在供词中坦认："任何公款之动支当然是社会所关心的事情。"
由于以上所达成之结论，地方法院送依据证词、诉状及申辩来审核哈金森控诉被告等之作为系一具"实际恶意"之请求。但地方法院发现本案并无真正所谓"实际恶意"之事实与问题存在。法院认为未作调查或报导失常都未能构成"实际恶意".同时认为在蒲、华二人之供词及诉状中均无任何证明显示蒲、华对其所作之声明之真实性曾有任何怀疑。地方法院引用其他法院之判例，在确定原告是否提具适证据证明对方有"实际恶意"一节，由法院对涉讼案件作明快裁决则系通案而非例外。
最后，地方法院裁决说：即使为本案之裁决计认定哈金森博士系一普通平民，故宪法第一条修正案之保障不适用于被告，但相关之州法亦授予权法院得作明快之裁决。
地方法院认为此处所称适用之州法系指密西根州或华府特区之法律。因在威斯康辛州之法律选择原则下（Choice-of-law Principles）未能决定何种法律应加适用，地方法院裁定哈金森不能在密西根州或华府特区管辖，请求赔偿。
联邦上诉法院维持地方法院原判决，确认宪法上议员言论免责权之规定系保障新闻稿及立法简讯中所载之议员声明。（579 F.2d 1027 CA 1978），上诉法院解释Doe v.McMillan，412 U.S.306（1973）一案系承认宪法对国会之"通知职责"为有限之保障，并下结论为：分发新闻稿及立法简讯并未超越立法目的所规定之条件。（579 F.2d，at 1033）。事后之电话（与政府有关机关）联络及蒲参议员在电视及广播电业所发表之声明虽均不受宪法上议员言论免责权之保障，但仍受宪法第一条修正案之保障，上诉法院在初步审理中系根据供词及申辩纪录而获致上述结论，并认定哈金森为一社会名流。（ld.，at 1034-1035）
之后，上诉法院再审查纪录以决定哈金森本人是否亦曾有"实际恶意"之表示。上诉法院同意地方法院之裁决"根据纪录，被告对其所发表之声明之实际或可能之'虚伪性'一无所知则不容置疑。（ld.，at 1035）"至原告同时提出其他申辩，认为地方法院在批准对其所控诽谤罪以外之罪状（诸如被告干涉其契约关系，蓄意造成精神折磨及侵犯其个人隐私权等）作明快裁决时亦犯有错误一节，亦为上诉法院所批驳：
本院（上诉法院）认为原告所提其他之伤害指控，仅系对被告所作之声明之反应而已。认其所指控的诽谤不实性本身不能在本案公开宣布，则原告即不能对因此所造成之伤害请求赔偿。
至地方法院裁决州法亦准许法院对被告作明快裁决一节，上诉法院则未处理。
Ⅲ
原告请求最高法院调查本案引起三项问题：一则涉及议员言论免责权条文的应用范围；二则牵涉宪法第一条修正案的应用；三则关系"明快裁决"的适当性，因为包括联邦宪法及州法的双重问题。至于宪法问题的发生是由于地方法院的看法，认为如果热衷联邦宪法第一条修正案的援用，则在诽谤诉讼中即需要一个对批准"明快裁决"持有亲切宽厚的司法态度才行。而州法问题的发生也是由于地方法院认定按照实际州法，哈金森即不能获得赔偿。
本院的惯例是假如能用非宪法理由可以处理之案件，即避免以宪法问题来裁决。（Siler v.Louisville Nashville R.Co.，213U.S.175，193，1909）如本院采取此一途径来处理本案，即可将原案发还上诉法院就其未加解决之州法问题予以重议。设地方法院已正确处理州法问题，即援用联邦宪法第一条修正案之解决方式即无必要。本院的结论为，基于对本案之特别考虑则需本安首先解决宪法问题。
宪法上关于议员论免责权之条款乃在保障国会义员"不仅免负诉讼后果，而且免受法律辩护的负担。"见Dombrowshi v. Eastland，387 U. S. 82，85（1967）；及Eastlnad v. U. S.Servicemen's Fund，421 U.s.491，503（1975）。如被告依宪法享有免责权，则其他问题即无需再议，因为依照宪法"议员言论对外不负责任".
一般而言，对宪法问题的考虑最终仍以宪法上议员言论免责权之条款解决。因之，本院理应将本案发还上诉法院考虑适用州法问题。但本案处理经过业已显示上诉法院无意维持地方法院过用州法解决之原则。本院揣度上诉法院之所以如此裁定即因其已有定论，即新闻稿及立法简讯均受联邦宪法议员言论免责条款之保障，上诉法院说明："新闻稿中暗示哈金森博士因此发财及其研究"容或重覆"之声明抑或有诽谤性这虚构成分。（579 F.2d，at 1035 n.15）鉴于以上说明，本院在Wolston v.Reader's Digest Assn.，inc.，Post，at 161 n.2一案所主张者亦适用于本案：
本院假定上诉法院一如本院均熟知一项一般原则，即凡在适用宪法问题之前先应以可以处理之法律或地方法律处理之。本院对上诉法院裁决意见中之注脚的解释是该院的管辖范围乃基于联邦与州之双重公民，该院认为如不涉及联邦宪法问题，则上诉案即无法处理。
鉴于处理本案之所必需，本院故须涉及联邦宪法第一条修正案及议员言论多责权之宪法条款。
Ⅳ
在支持上诉法院所作关于新闻稿及立法简讯均受宪法议员言论免责权条文保障之裁决一节上，被告则凭藉历史先例及当今国会的真实惯例。彼等辩称我国宪法之上议员言论免责条款之动力系源自于英国国会发展史，努力保护议员批评英皇动用国库开支的权利，以及下议院议长因在议会之外出版报告而被判弄。被告辩称时至今日在两院议场中极少有辩论或演讲。基此理由，被告坚持国会议员必需透过新闻发布及立法简讯以与其他议员沟通。例如，蒲参议员在其向法院之供词中说：
在十九年的参院工作中，我发现在议会上的声明或出现于国会纪录的事情往往未受到大多数参议员或几乎全总后从议员的注意，因为他们根本不看国会纪录。如果有人送给他们一份新闻稿之类的文件那就会受到他们的注意……。
被告也辩称一个国会议员责任的主要部分即是将正在讨论中的问题通知其选区选民及其他关心同一问题的议员。
在一百九十年的历史中，由本院直接裁决与议员言论免责权有关的案子相当少。Eastland v.U.S.Servicemen's Fund； Doe v.McMillan（1973）；Gravel v. U. S.（1972）；U. S. v. Brewster （1972）；Dombrowski v. Eastland； U. S. v. Johnson （1966）；Kilbourn v.Thompson （1881）。从议员言论免责权条文的字面上看，它当然只限于对"在两院言词及辩论"的狭义保障。但是本院对言论免责条款一个较切实际而非将议员言论免责的保障仅仅局限于议会会场的严格的字面意义。所以，本院裁决国会委员会所举办的听证会，即使它在证场之外举行也在保障之列；委员会的报告亦予保障。（参见 Dol v.McMillan；Gravel v. U. S.；Coffin v. coffin （1808）。
对议员言论免责条文所作之超越严格字面以外的变通解释迄今未远离仅限于保障立法活动之目的。根据杰弗逊的说法是：
免责权是限于在立法过程中在议会所作的事情……因为议员不得超越他的地位及职责的范围与限制（Thomas Jefferson，A Manual of Parliamentary Practice （1854）
担任拟订宪草人之一的威尔逊（James Wilson）曾任最高法院大法官，在一七九○年至一七九二年所作的多场演讲中亦表示同样的看法。他不赞成布拉克斯统W.Blackstone的主张
U.S. Supreme Court
HUTCHINSON v. PROXMIRE， 443 U.S. 111 （1979）
443 U.S. 111
HUTCHINSON v. PROXMIRE ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT.
No. 78-680.
Argued April 17， 1979.
Decided June 26， 1979.
Respondent United States Senator publicizes examples of wasteful governmental spending by awarding his "Golden Fleece of the Month Award." One such award was given to federal agencies that had funded petitioner scientist's study of emotional behavior in which he sought an objective measure of aggression， concentrating upon the behavior patterns of certain animals. The award was announced in a speech prepared with the help of respondent legislative assistant， the text of which was incorporated in a widely distributed press release. Subsequently， the award was also referred to in newsletters sent out by the Senator， in a television interview program on which he appeared， and in telephone calls made by the legislative assistant to the sponsoring federal agencies. Petitioner sued respondents in Federal District Court for defamation， alleging， inter alia， that in making the award and publicizing it nationwide， respondents had damaged him in his professional and academic standing. The District Court granted summary judgment for respondents， holding that the Speech or Debate Clause afforded absolute immunity for investigating the funding of petitioner's research， for the speech in the Senate， and for the press release， since it fell within the "informing function" of Congress. The court further held that petitioner was a "public figure" for purposes of determining respondents' liability； that respondents were protected by the First Amendment thereby requiring petitioner to prove "actual malice"； and that based on the depositions， affidavits， and pleadings there was no genuine issue of material fact on the issue of actual malice， neither respondents' failure to investigate nor unfair editing and summarizing being sufficient to establish "actual malice." Finally， the court held that even if petitioner were found to be a "private person，" relevant state law required a summary judgment for respondents. The Court of Appeals affirmed， holding that the Speech or Debate Clause protected the statements made in the press release and newsletters and that， although the followup telephone calls and the statements made on television were not protected by that Clause， they were protected by the First Amendment， since petitioner was a "public figure，" and that on the record there was no showing of "actual malice." [443 U.S. 111， 112]
Held：
1. While this Court's practice is to avoid reaching constitutional questions if a dispositive nonconstitutional ground is available， special considerations in this case mandate that the constitutional questions first be resolved. If respondents have immunity under the Speech or Debate Clause， no other questions need be considered. And where it appears that the Court of Appeals would not affirm the District Court's state-law holding so that the appeal could not be decided without reaching the First Amendment issue， that issue will also be reached here. Pp. 122-123.
2. The Speech or Debate Clause does not protect transmittal of information by individual Members of Congress by press releases and newsletters. Pp. 123-133.
（a） There is nothing in the history of the Clause or its language suggesting any intent to create an absolute privilege from liability or suit for defamatory statements made outside the legislative Chambers； precedents support the conclusion that a Member may be held liable for republishing defamatory statements originally made in the Chamber. Pp. 127-130.
（b） Neither the newsletters nor the press release here was "essential to the deliberation of the Senate" and neither was part of the deliberative process. Gravel v. United States， 408 U.S. 606 ； Doe v. McMillan， 412 U.S. 306 . P. 130.
（c） The newsletters and press release were not privileged as part of the "informing function" of Members of Congress to tell the public about their activities. Individual Members' transmittal of information about their activities by press releases and newsletters is not part of the legislative function or the deliberations that make up the legislative process； in contrast to voting and preparing committee reports， which are part of Congress' function to inform itself， newsletters and press releases are primarily means of informing those outside the legislative forum and represent the views and will of a single Member. Doe v. McMillan， supra， distinguished. Pp： 132-133.
3. Petitioner is not a "public figure" so as to make the "actual malice" standard of proof of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan， 376 U.S. 254 ， applicable. Neither the fact that local newspapers reported the federal grants to petitioner for his research nor the fact that he had access to the news media as shown by reports of his response to the announcement of the Golden Fleece Award， demonstrates that he was a public figure prior to the controversy engendered by that award. His access， such as it was， came after the alleged libel and was limited to responding to the announcement of the award. Those charged with alleged defamation cannot， by their own conduct， create their own defense by making [443 U.S. 111， 113] the claimant a public figure. Nor is the concern about public expenditures sufficient to make petitioner a public figure， petitioner at no time having assumed any role of public prominence in the broad question of such concern. Pp. 133-136.
579 F.2d 1027， reversed and remanded.
BURGER， C. J.， delivered the opinion of the Court， in which WHITE， MARSHALL， BLACKMUN， POWELL， REHNQUIST， and STEVENS， JJ.， joined， and in all but n. 10 of which STEWART， J.， joined. STEWART， J.， filed a statement concurring in part and dissenting in part， post， p. 136. BRENNAN， J.， filed a dissenting opinion， post， p. 136.
Michael E. Cavanaugh argued the cause and filed a briefs for petitioner.
Alan Raywid argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents. *
[ Footnote * ] Bruce J. Montgomery and John D. Lane filed a brief for the American Psychological Association et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Richard M. Schmidt， Jr.， for the American Society of Newspaper Editors et al.； and by Chester H. Smith for Warren G. Magnuson et al. Stanley M. Brand filed a brief for Thomas P. O'Neill， Jr.， Speaker of the United States House of Representatives， et al. as amici curiae.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court.
We granted certiorari， 439 U.S. 1066 （1979）， to resolve three issues： （1） Whether a Member of Congress is protected by the Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution， Art. I， 6， against suits for allegedly defamatory statements made by the Member in press releases and newsletters； （2） whether petitioner Hutchinson is either a "public figure" or a "public official，" thereby making applicable the "actual malice" standard of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan， 376 U.S. 254 （1964）； and （3） whether respondents were entitled to summary judgment. [443 U.S. 111， 114]
Ronald Hutchinson， a research behavioral scientist， sued respondents， William Proxmire， a United States Senator， and his legislative assistant， Morton Schwartz， for defamation arising out of Proxmire's giving what he called his "Golden Fleece" award. The "award" went to federal agencies that had sponsored Hutchinson's research. Hutchinson alleged that in making the award and publicizing it nationwide， respondents had libeled him， damaging him in his professional and academic standing， and had interfered with his contractual relations. The District Court granted summary judgment for respondents and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
We reverse and remand to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I
Respondent Proxmire is a United States Senator from Wisconsin. In March 1975， he initiated the "Golden Fleece of the Month Award" to publicize what he perceived to be the most egregious examples of wasteful governmental spending. The second such award， in April 1975， went to the National Science Foundation， the National Aeronautics and Space Administration， and the Office of Naval Research， for spending almost half a million dollars during the preceding seven years to fund Hutchinson's research. 1
At the time of the award， Hutchinson was director of research at the Kalamazoo State Mental Hospital. Before that he had held a similar position at the Ft. Custer State Home. Both the hospital and the home are operated by the Michigan State Department of Mental Health； he was therefore a state employee in both positions. During most of the period in question he was also an adjunct professor at Western Michigan University. When the research department at Kalamazoo [443 U.S. 111， 115] State Mental Hospital was closed in June 1975， Hutchinson became research director of the Foundation for Behavioral Research， a nonprofit organization. The research funding was transferred from the hospital to the foundation.
The bulk of Hutchinson's research was devoted to the study of emotional behavior. In particular， he sought an objective measure of aggression， concentrating upon the behavior patterns of certain animals， such as the clenching of jaws when they were exposed to various aggravating stressful stimuli. 2 The National Aeronautics and Space Agency and the Navy were interested in the potential of this research for resolving problems associated with confining humans in close quarters for extended periods of time in space and undersea exploration.
The Golden Fleece Award to the agencies that had sponsored Hutchinson's research was based upon research done for Proxmire by Schwartz. While seeking evidence of wasteful governmental spending， Schwartz read copies of reports that Hutchinson had prepared under grants from NASA. Those reports revealed that Hutchinson had received grants from the Office of Naval Research， the National Science Foundation， and the Michigan State Department of Mental Health. Schwartz also learned that other federal agencies had funded Hutchinson's research. After contacting a number of federal and state agencies， Schwartz helped to prepare a speech for Proxmire to present in the Senate on April 18， 1975； the text was then incorporated into an advance press release， with only [443 U.S. 111， 116] the addition of introductory and concluding sentences. Copies were sent to a mailing list of 275 members of the news media throughout the United States and abroad.
Schwartz telephoned Hutchinson before releasing the speech to tell him of the award； Hutchinson protested that the release contained an inaccurate and incomplete summary of his research. Schwartz replied that he thought the summary was fair.
In the speech， Proxmire described the federal grants for Hutchinson's research， concluding with the following comment： 3
"The funding of this nonsense makes me almost angry enough to scream and kick or even clench my jaw. It seems to me it is outrageous.
"Dr. Hutchinson's studies should make the taxpayers as well as his monkeys grind their teeth. In fact， the good doctor has made a fortune from his monkeys and in the process made a monkey out of the American taxpayer.
"It is time for the Federal Government to get out of this `monkey business.' In view of the transparent worthlessness of Hutchinson's study of jaw-grinding and biting by angry or hard-drinking monkeys， it is time we put a stop to the bite Hutchinson and the bureaucrats who fund him have been taking of the taxpayer." 121 Cong. Rec. 10803 （1975）。 [443 U.S. 111， 117]
In May 1975， Proxmire referred to his Golden Fleece Awards in a newsletter sent to about 100，000 people whose names were on a mailing list that included constituents in Wisconsin as well as persons in other states. The newsletter repeated the essence of the speech and the press release. Later in 1975， Proxmire appeared on a television interview program where he referred to Hutchinson's research， though he did not mention Hutchinson by name. 4
The final reference to the research came in a newsletter in February 1976. In that letter， Proxmire summarized his Golden Fleece Awards of 1975. The letter did not mention Hutchinson's name， but it did report：
" - The NSF， the Space Agency， and the Office of Naval Research won the `Golden Fleece' for spending jointly $500，000 to determine why monkeys clench their jaws.
。 . . . .
"All the studies on why monkeys clench their jaws were dropped. No more monkey business." App. 168-171.
After the award was announced， Schwartz， acting on behalf of Proxmire， contacted a number of the federal agencies that had sponsored the research. In his deposition he stated that he did not attempt to dissuade them from continuing to fund the research but merely discussed the subject. 5 Hutchinson， by contrast， contends that these calls were intended to persuade the agencies to terminate his grants and contracts. [443 U.S. 111， 118]
II
On April 16， 1976， Hutchinson filed this suit in United States District Court in Wisconsin. 6 In Count I he alleges that as a result of the actions of Proxmire and Schwartz he has "suffered a loss of respect in his profession， has suffered injury to his feelings， has been humiliated， held up to public scorn， suffered extreme mental anguish and physical illness and pain to his person. Further， he has suffered a loss of income and ability to earn income in the future." Count II alleges that the respondents' conduct has interfered with Hutchinson's contractual relationships with supporters of his research. He later amended the complaint to add an allegation that his rights of privacy and peace and tranquility have been infringed.
Respondents moved for a change of venue and for summary judgment. In their motion for summary judgment they asserted that all of their acts and utterances were protected by the Speech or Debate Clause. In addition， they asserted that their criticism of the spending of public funds was privileged under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. They argued that Hutchinson was both a public figure and a public official， and therefore would be obliged to prove the existence of "actual malice." Respondents contended that the facts of this case would not support a finding of actual malice.
Without ruling on venue， the District Court granted respondents' motion for summary judgment. 431 F.Supp. 1311 （WD Wis. 1977）。 In so ruling， the District Court relied on both grounds urged by respondents. It reasoned that the Speech or Debate Clause afforded absolute immunity for respondents' activities in investigating the funding of Hutchinson's research， for Proxmire's speech in the Senate， and for the press release covering the speech. The court concluded that the investigations and the speech were clearly within the [443 U.S. 111， 119] ambit of the Clause. The press release was said to be protected because it fell within the "informing function" of Congress. To support its conclusion， the District Court relied upon cases interpreting the franking privilege granted to Members by statute. See 39 U.S.C. 3210.
Although the District Court referred to the "informing function" of Congress and to the franking privilege， it did not base its conclusion concerning the press release on those analogies. Instead， the District Court held that the "press release， in a constitutional sense， was no different than would have been a television or radio broadcast of his speech from the Senate floor." 7 431 F. Supp.， at 1325. That the District Court did not rely upon the "informing function" is clear from its implicit holding that the newsletters were not protected.
The District Court then turned to the First Amendment to explain the grant of summary judgment on the claims arising from the newsletters and interviews. It concluded that Hutchinson was a public figure for purposes of determining respondents' liability：
"Given Dr. Hutchinson's long involvement with publicly-funded research， his active solicitation of federal and state grants， the local press coverage of his research， and the public interest in the expenditure of public funds on the precise activities in which he voluntarily participated， the court concludes that he is a public figure for the purpose of this suit. As he acknowledged in his deposition， `Certainly， any expenditure of public funds is a matter of public interest.'" Id.， at 1327. 8 [443 U.S. 111， 120]
Having reached that conclusion， the District Court relied upon the depositions， affidavits， and pleadings before it to evaluate Hutchinson's claim that respondents had acted with "actual malice." The District Court found that there was no genuine issue of material fact on that issue. It held that neither a failure to investigate nor unfair editing and summarizing could establish "actual malice." It also held that there was nothing in the affidavits or depositions of either Proxmire or Schwartz to indicate that they ever entertained any doubt about the truth of their statements. Relying upon cases from other courts， the District Court said that in determining whether a plaintiff had made an adequate showing of "actual malice，" summary judgment might well be the rule rather than the exception. Id.， at 1330. 9
Finally， the District Court concluded：
"But even if for the purpose of this suit it is found that Dr. Hutchinson is a private person so that First Amendment protections do not extend to [respondents]， relevant state law dictates the grant of summary judgment." Ibid.
The District Court held that the controlling state law was either that of Michigan or that of the District of Columbia. Without deciding which law would govern under Wisconsin's choice-of-law principles， the District Court concluded that Hutchinson would not be able to recover in either jurisdiction.
The Court of Appeals affirmed， holding that the Speech or Debate Clause protected the statements made in the press release [443 U.S. 111， 121] and in the newsletters. 579 F.2d 1027 （CA7 1978）。 It interpreted Doe v. McMillan， 412 U.S. 306 （1973）， as recognizing a limited protection for the "informing function" of Congress and concluded that distribution of both the press release and the newsletters did not exceed what was required for legislative purposes. 579 F.2d， at 1033. The followup telephone calls and the statements made by Proxmire on television and radio were not protected by the Speech or Debate Clause； they were， however， held by the Court of Appeals to be protected by the First Amendment. 10 It reached that conclusion after first finding that， based on the affidavits and pleadings of record， Hutchinson was a "public figure." Id.， at 1034-1035. The court then examined the record to determine whether there had been a showing by Hutchinson of "actual malice." It agreed with the District Court "that， upon this record， there is no question that [respondents] did not have knowledge of the actual or probable `falsity' of their statements." Id.， at 1035. The Court of Appeals also rejected Hutchinson's argument that the District Court had erred in granting summary judgment on the claimed wrongs other than defamation - interference with [443 U.S. 111， 122] contractual relations， intentional infliction of emotional anguish， and invasion of privacy：
"We view these additional allegations of harm as merely the results of the statements made by the defendants. If the alleged defamatory falsehoods themselves are privileged， it would defeat the privilege to allow recovery for the specified damages which they cause." Id.， at 1036 （footnote omitted）。 11
The Court of Appeals did not review the District Court's holding that state law also justified summary judgment for respondents.
III
The petition for certiorari raises three questions. One involves the scope of the Speech or Debate Clause； another involves First Amendment claims； a third concerns the appropriateness of summary judgment， embracing both a constitutional issue and a state-law issue. The constitutional issue arose from the District Court's view that solicitude for the First Amendment required a more hospitable judicial attitude toward granting summary judgment in a libel case. See n. 9， supra. The state-law issue arose because the District Court concluded that， as a matter of local law， Hutchinson could not recover.
Our practice is to avoid reaching constitutional questions if a dispositive nonconstitutional ground is available. See， e.g.， Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co.， 213 U.S. 175， 193 （1909）。 Were we to follow that course here we would remand to the Court of Appeals to review the state-law question which it did not consider. If the District Court correctly decided the state-law question， resolution of the First Amendment issue would be unnecessary. We conclude， however， that special considerations in this case mandate that we first resolve the constitutional questions. [443 U.S. 111， 123]
The purpose of the Speech or Debate Clause is to protect Members of Congress "not only from the consequences of litigation's results but also from the burden of defending themselves." Dombrowski v. Eastland， 387 U.S. 82， 85 （1967）。 See also Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund， 421 U.S. 491， 503 （1975）。 If the respondents have immunity under the Clause， no other questions need be considered for they may "not be questioned in any other Place."
Ordinarily， consideration of the constitutional issue would end with resolution of the Speech or Debate Clause question. We would then remand for the Court of Appeals to consider the issue of state law. Here， however， there is an indication that the Court of Appeals would not affirm the state-law holding. We surmise this because， in explaining its conclusion that the press release and the newsletters were protected by the Speech or Debate Clause， the Court of Appeals stated： "[T]he statements in the press release intimating that Dr. Hutchinson had made a personal fortune and that the research was `perhaps duplicative' may be defamatory false-hoods." 579 F.2d， at 1035 n. 15. In light of that surmise， what we said in Wolston v. Reader's Digest Assn.， Inc.， post， at 161 n. 2， is also appropriate here： "We assume that the Court of Appeals is as familiar as we are with the general principle that dispositive issues of statutory and local law are to be treated before reaching constitutional issues. . . . We interpret the footnote to the Court of Appeals opinion in this case， where jurisdiction is based upon diversity of citizenship， to indicate its view that . . . the appeal could not be decided without reaching the constitutional question." In light of the necessity to do so， we therefore reach the First Amendment issue as well as the Speech or Debate Clause question.
IV
In support of the Court of Appeals holding that newsletters and press releases are protected by the Speech or Debate Clause， respondents rely upon both historical precedent and [443 U.S. 111， 124] present-day congressional practices. They contend that impetus for the Speech or Debate Clause privilege in our Constitution came from the history of parliamentary efforts to protect the right of members to criticize the spending of the Crown and from the prosecution of a Speaker of the House of Commons for publication of a report outside of Parliament. Respondents also contend that in the modern day very little speech or debate occurs on the floor of either House； from this they argue that press releases and newsletters are necessary for Members of Congress to communicate with other Members. For example， in his deposition Proxmire testified：
"I have found in 19 years in the Senate that very often a statement on the floor of the Senate or something that appears in the Congressional Record misses the attention of most members of the Senate， and virtually all members of the House， because they don't read the Congressional Record. If they are handed a news release， or something， that is going to call it to their attention . . . ." App. 220.
Respondents also argue that an essential part of the duties of a Member of Congress is to inform constituents， as well as other Members， of the issues being considered.
The Speech or Debate Clause has been directly passed on by this Court relatively few times in 190 years. Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund， supra； Doe v. McMillan， 412 U.S. 306 （1973）； Gravel v. United States， 408 U.S. 606 （1972）； United States v. Brewster， 408 U.S. 501 （1972）； Dombrowski v. Eastland， supra； United States v. Johnson， 383 U.S. 169 （1966）； Kilbourn v. Thompson， 103 U.S. 168 （1881）。 Literal reading of the Clause would， of course， confine its protection narrowly to a "Speech or Debate in either House." But the Court has given the Clause a practical rather than a strictly literal reading which would limit the protection to utterances made within the four walls of either Chamber. Thus， we have held that committee hearings are protected， even if held outside the Chambers； committee reports are also protected. [443 U.S. 111， 125] Doe v. McMillan， supra； Gravel v. United States， supra， Cf. Coffin v. Coffin， 4 Mass. *1， *27-*28 （1808）。
The gloss going beyond a strictly literal reading of the Clause has not， however， departed from the objective of protecting only legislative activities. In Thomas Jefferson's view：
"[The privilege] is restrained to things done in the House in a Parliamentary course . . . . For [the Member] is not to have privilege contra morem parliamentarium， to exceed the bounds and limits of his place and duty." T. Jefferson， A Manual of Parliamentary Practice 20 （1854）， reprinted in The Complete Jefferson 704 （S. Padover ed. 1943）。
One of the draftsmen of the Constitution， James Wilson， expressed a similar thought in lectures delivered between 1790 and 1792 while he was a Justice of this Court. He rejected Blackstone's statement， 1 W. Blackstone， Commentaries *164， that Parliament's privileges were preserved by keeping them indefinite：
"Very different is the case with regard to the legislature of the United States . . . . The great maxims， upon which our law of parliament is founded， are defined and ascertained in our constitutions. The arcana of privilege， and the arcana of prerogative， are equally unknown to our system of jurisprudence." 2 J. Wilson， Works 35 （J. Andrews ed. 1896）。 12
In this respect， Wilson was underscoring the very purpose of our Constitution - inter alia， to provide written definitions of the powers， privileges， and immunities granted rather than rely on evolving constitutional concepts identified from diverse sources as in English law. Like thoughts were expressed [443 U.S. 111， 126] by Joseph Story， writing in the first edition of his Commentaries on the Constitution in 1833：
"But this privilege is strictly confined to things done in the course of parliamentary proceedings， and does not cover things done beyond the place and limits of duty." Id.， 863， at 329.
Cf. Coffin v. Coffin， supra， at *34.
In United States v. Brewster， supra， we acknowledged the historical roots of the Clause going back to the long struggle between the English House of Commons and the Tudor and Stuart monarchs when both criminal and civil processes were employed by Crown authority to intimidate legislators. Yet we cautioned that the Clause.
"must be interpreted in light of the American experience， and in the context of the American constitutional scheme of government rather than the English parliamentary system. . . . [T]heir Parliament is the supreme authority， not a coordinate branch. Our speech or debate privilege was designed to preserve legislative independence， not supremacy." 408 U.S.， at 508 .
Nearly a century ago， in Kilbourn v. Thompson， supra， at 204， this Court held that the Clause extended "to things generally done in a session of the House by one of its members in relation to the business before it." （Emphasis added.） More recently we expressed a similar definition of the scope of the Clause：
"Legislative acts are not all-encompassing. The hear of the Clause is speech or debate in either House. Inso far as the Clause is construed to reach other matters， the must be an integral part of the deliberative and communicative processes by which Members participate in committee and House proceedings with respect to the consideration and passage or rejection of proposed legislation or with respect to other matters which the Constitution places within the jurisdiction of either House. As the [443 U.S. 111， 127] Court of Appeals put it， the courts have extended the privilege to matters beyond pure speech or debate in either House， but `only when necessary to prevent indirect impairment of such deliberations.'" Gravel v. United States， 408 U.S.， at 625 （quoting United States v. Doe， 455 F.2d 753， 760 （CA1 1972）） （emphasis added）。
Cf. Doe v. McMillan， 412 U.S.， at 313 -314， 317； United States v. Brewster， 408 U.S.， at 512 ， 515-516， 517-518； Long v. Ansell， 293 U.S. 76， 82 （1934）。
Whatever imprecision there may be in the term "legislative activities，" it is clear that nothing in history or in the explicit language of the Clause suggests any intention to create an absolute privilege from liability or suit for defamatory statements made outside the Chamber. In Brewster， supra， at 507， we observed：
"The immunities of the Speech or Debate Clause were not written into the Constitution simply for the personal or private benefit of Members of Congress， but to protect the integrity of the legislative process by insuring the independence of individual legislators."
Claims under the Clause going beyond what is needed to protect legislative independence are to be closely scrutinized. In Brewster we took note of this：
"The authors of our Constitution were well aware of the history of both the need for the privilege and the abuses that could flow from too sweeping safeguards. In order to preserve other values， they wrote the privilege so that it tolerates and protects behavior on the part of Members not tolerated and protected when done by other citizens， but the shield does not extend beyond what is necessary to preserve the integrity of the legislative process." 408 U.S.， at 517 （emphasis added）。
Indeed， the precedents abundantly support the conclusion that a Member may be held liable for republishing defamatory [443 U.S. 111， 128] statements originally made in either House. We perceive no basis for departing from that long-established rule.
Mr. Justice Story in his Commentaries， for example， explained that there was no immunity for republication of a speech first delivered in Congress：
"Therefore， although a speech delivered in the house of commons is privileged， and the member cannot be questioned respecting it elsewhere； yet， if he publishes his speech， and it contains libellous matter， he is liable to an action and prosecution therefor， as in common cases of libel. And the same principles seem applicable to the privilege of debate and speech in congress. No man ought to have a right to defame others under colour of a performance of the duties of his office. And if he does so in the actual discharge of his duties in congress， that furnishes no reason， why he should be enabled through the medium of the press to destroy the reputation， and invade the repose of other citizens. It is neither within the scope of his duty， nor in furtherance of public rights， or public policy. Every citizen has as good a right to be protected by the laws from malignant scandal， and false charges， and defamatory imputations， as a member of congress has to utter them in his seat." 13 2 J. Story， Commentaries [443 U.S. 111， 129] on the Constitution 863， p. 329 （1833） （emphasis added）。
See also L. Cushing， Elements of the Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies in the United States of America 604， p. 244 （1st ed. reprint 1971）。
Story summarized the state of the common law at the time the Constitution was drafted， recalling that Parliament had by then succeeded in its struggle to secure freedom of debate. But the privilege did not extend to republication of libelous remarks even though first made in Parliament. Thus， in King v. Lord Abingdon， 1 Esp. 225， 170 Eng. Rep. 337 （N.P. 1794）， Lord Chief Justice Kenyon rejected Lord Abingdon's argument that parliamentary privilege protected him from suit for republication of a speech first made in the House of Lords：
"[A]s to the words in question， had they been spoken in the House of Lords， and confined to its walls， [the] Court would have had no jurisdiction to call his Lordship before them， to answer for them as an offence； but . . . in the present case， the offence was the publication under his authority and sanction， and at his expense： . . . a member of Parliament had certainly a right to publish his speech， but that speech should not be made the vehicle of slander against any individual； if it was， it was a libel . . . ." Id.， at 228， 170 Eng. Rep.， at 338.
A similar result was reached in King v. Creevey， 1 M. & S. 273， 105 Eng. Rep. 102 （K. B. 1813）。 [443 U.S. 111， 130]
In Gravel v. United States， 408 U.S.， at 622 -626， we recognized that the doctrine denying immunity for republication had been accepted in the United States：
"[P]rivate publication by Senator Gravel . . . was in no way essential to the deliberations of the Senate； nor does questioning as to private publication threaten the integrity or independence of the Senate by impermissibly exposing its deliberations to executive influence." Id.， at 625.
We reaffirmed that principle in Doe v. McMillan， 412 U.S.， at 314 -315：
"A Member of Congress may not with impunity publish a libel from the speaker's stand in his home district， and clearly the Speech or Debate Clause would not protect such an act even though the libel was read from an official committee report. The reason is that republishing a libel under such circumstances is not an essential part of the legislative process and is not part of that deliberative process `by which Members participate in committee and House proceedings.'" （Footnote omitted； quoting from Gravel v. United States， supra， at 625.） 14
We reach a similar conclusion here. A speech by Proxmire in the Senate would be wholly immune and would be available to other Members of Congress and the public in the Congressional Record. But neither the newsletters nor the press release was "essential to the deliberations of the Senate" and neither was part of the deliberative process.
Respondents， however， argue that newsletters and press releases are essential to the functioning of the Senate； without [443 U.S. 111， 131] them， they assert， a Senator cannot have a significant impact on the other Senators. We may assume that a Member's published statements exert some influence on other votes in the Congress and therefore have a relationship to the legislative and deliberative process. But in Brewster， 408 U.S.， at 512 ， we rejected respondents' expansive reading of the Clause：
"It is well known， of course， that Members of the Congress engage in many activities other than the purely legislative activities protected by the Speech or Debate Clause. These include . . . preparing so-called `news letters' to constituents， news releases， and speeches delivered outside the Congress."
There we went on to note that United States v. Johnson， 383 U.S. 169 （1966）， had carefully distinguished between what is only "related to the due functioning of the legislative process，" and what constitutes the legislative process entitled to immunity under the Clause：
"In stating that those things [Johnson's attempts to influence the Department of Justice] `in no wise related to the due functioning of the legislative process' were not covered by the privilege， the Court did not in any sense imply as a corollary that everything that `related' to the office of a Member was shielded by the Clause. Quite the contrary， in Johnson we held， citing Kilbourn v. Thompson， supra， that only acts generally done in the course of the process of enacting legislation were protected.
。 . . . .
"In no case has this Court ever treated the Clause as protecting all conduct relating to the legislative process.
。 . . . .
". . . In its narrowest scope， the Clause is a very large， albeit essential， grant of privilege. It has enabled reckless men to slander [by speech or debate] and even destroy [443 U.S. 111， 132] others with impunity， but that was the conscious choice of the Framers." 408 U.S.， at 513 -516. （Emphasis in original.）
We are unable to discern any "conscious choice" to grant immunity for defamatory statements scattered far and wide by mail， press， and the electronic media.
Respondents also argue that newsletters and press releases are privileged as part of the "informing function" of Congress. Advocates of a broad reading of the "informing function" sometimes tend to confuse two uses of the term "informing." In one sense， Congress informs itself collectively by way of hearings of its committees. It was in that sense that Woodrow Wilson used "informing" in a statement quoted by respondents. In reality， Wilson's statement related to congressional efforts to learn of the activities of the Executive Branch and administrative agencies； he did not include wideranging inquiries by individual Members on subjects of their choice. Moreover， Wilson's statement itself clearly implies a distinction between the informing function and the legislative function：
"Unless Congress have and use every means of acquainting itself with the acts and the disposition of the administrative agents of the government， the country must be helpless to learn how it is being served； and unless Congress both scrutinize these things and sift them by every form of discussion， the country must remain in embarrassing， crippling ignorance of the very affairs which it is most important that it should understand and direct. The informing function of Congress should be preferred even to its legislative function. . . . [T]he only really self-governing people is that people which discusses and interrogates its administration." W. Wilson， Congressional Government 303 （1885）。
It is in this narrower Wilsonian sense that this Court has employed "informing" in previous cases holding that congressional [443 U.S. 111， 133] efforts to inform itself through committee hearings are part of the legislative function.
The other sense of the term， and the one relied upon by respondents， perceives it to be the duty of Members to tell the public about their activities. Valuable and desirable as it may be in broad terms， the transmittal of such information by individual Members in order to inform the public and other Members is not a part of the legislative function or the deliberations that make up the legislative process. 15 As a result， transmittal of such information by press releases and newsletters is not protected by the Speech or Debate Clause.
Doe v. McMillan， 412 U.S. 306 （1973）， is not to the contrary. It dealt only with reports from congressional committees， and held that Members of Congress could not be held liable for voting to publish a report. Voting and preparing committee reports are the individual and collective expressions of opinion within the legislative process. As such， they are protected by the Speech or Debate Clause. Newsletters and press releases， by contrast， are primarily means of informing those outside the legislative forum； they represent the views and will of a single Member. It does not disparage either their value or their import
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